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Around the millennium there was extensive debate in the United Kingdom
about the possible use of predictive genetic tests by insurance companies.
Many insurance experts, geneticists, and public policymakers appeared to
believe that genetic test results would soon become widely used by the
insurance industry. This expectation has not been borne out. This article
outlines the history of exaggerated perceptions of the significance of genetic
test results to insurance, with particular reference to the United Kingdom,
suggesting reasons why they arose and also why they have declined. The
article concludes with some speculation about how policy on genetics and
insurance might develop in future.
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Introduction
In the years around the millennium there was extensive discussion in many
countries of the possible use of predictive genetic tests by insurance companies.
Table 1 shows the annual number of mentions of the phrase “genetics and insur-
ance” in English language news items in one online database. It can be seen that
the peak in comment around the millennium has now greatly receded.
The decline in comment reflects a consensus in many countries around legisla-
tive or quasi-legislative initiatives which have restricted the ability of insurers to
ask questions about any predictive genetic tests prospective customers may have
taken. In the United Kingdom, a ban on the use of genetic tests in insurance has
been extended to 2017, subject to review in 2014. The Genetics and Insurance
Committee (GAIC), established by the UK government in 1999 to approve the
use of genetic tests in insurance, approved one test in 2000; but thereafter insurers
made no further applications for approval of tests, with the result that GAIC became
inactive, and was formally disbanded in 2009. Laws restricting the ability of
insurers to use genetic tests have also been enacted in many European countries,
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including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, and the Nether-
lands. The claims by many insurance experts and public policymakers around
the millennium that genetic test results would soon become widely used in
insurance can now be seen by all as exaggerated or misconceived. This article
examines the history of this misconception, with particular reference to the
United Kingdom, suggesting reasons why it arose and also why it has declined.
Several previous authors in this journal have examined insurers’ and policy-
makers’ responses to the issue of genetics and insurance. Van Hoyweghen et al.
(2005) characterize insurers’ response as passing through three phases: first treating
the issue as a public relations problem; then an appeal to science as a bulwark
against regulation; and finally an acceptance that science did not provide robust jus-
tification for insurers’ ideological preference for implementing any technically
feasible discrimination, and that politically negotiated solutions between that pre-
ference and wider social preferences were unavoidable. Van Hoyweghen and
Horstman (2009) record the efforts of global reinsurers to develop an evidence
base to provide better justifications for recommendations in the rating manuals
which they provide to direct insurers. The survey of Joly et al. (2010) of regulatory
policy on genetics and insurance in 47 countries emphasizes the role of contextual
factors in each country in influencing policy, in particular legal traditions, the
social role of insurance, and the interplay between private and public healthcare
systems. Liukko (2010) describes the distinctive terms of public debate in
Finland, where the focus is primarily on ensuring the privacy of genetic test
results, rather than their potential effects on social solidarity.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section gives a brief
history of public policy towards genetics and insurance in the UK. The article
then gives a critique of the actuarial ideology which led to the use of genetic
tests by insurers being promoted by policymakers around the millennium. The
article then considers why this ideology attracted much support from policymakers
despite its flaws, and then why it has more recently lost some of its earlier salience.
Table 1. Occurrences of “genetics and insurance” in English language news items worldwide, by year.
Year Number of mentions Year Number of mentions
1997 14 2004 18
1998 11 2005 28
1999 42 2006 37
2000 114 2007 29
2001 140 2008 15
2002 21 2009 8
2003 54 2010 17(∗)
Source: Nexis UK proprietary database [accessed 18 June 2011].
Notes: (∗) All 17 mentions in 2010 arise from one news event: the mistaken inclusion of the Genetics and Insurance
Committee (GAIC) in a list of quangos recommended for disbandment. GAIC had in fact already been disbanded
in 2009. Apart from this, the database shows no press comment on genetics and insurance in 2010.
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The final section speculates on the possible course of future public policy on
genetics and insurance.
History of public policy towards genetics and insurance in the UK
A convenient starting date for a history is 1995, the year in which the UK
Parliament Science and Technology Select Committee published a report Human
genetics: the science and its consequences (Select Committee, 1995) which
represented the first substantial attention given to the matter by legislators. The
report made dramatic predictions of the effect which genetic information would
soon have in the insurance industry:
Many of our witnesses were very concerned that the availability of genetic information
might have profound effects on the insurer as well as the insured. (paragraph 235)
Dr Barr told us: “My experience as someone who studies the economics of insurance
is to say that if the effectiveness of genetic testing spreads as widely as we are
told, then that will have very major implications for insurance very quickly.”
(paragraph 237)
. . . the great majority of our witnesses, including those with expertise in genetics,
think that such information could have major implications for the industry in a rela-
tively short time. (paragraph 247)
The Select Committee recommended that the insurance industry be given one year
to produce proposals for dealing with genetic tests which were acceptable to
Parliament, and that if it did not do so, the government should legislate.
The government rejected this recommendation and instead formed another
committee, the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC) and asked it to
make recommendations. In December 1997 the HGAC recommended a two-year
moratorium on the use of tests by insurers (HGAC 1997).
The government again rejected this recommendation, and instead in April 1999
established a Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC) to approve the use of
specific genetic tests in insurance. The terms of reference of GAIC were developed
by consultation with the insurance industry; its rationale was essentially to approve
tests if they might be of any commercial value to insurers, subject to insurers
demonstrating the clinical and actuarial relevance of particular tests. GAIC was
not asked to consider any wider implications of genetic discrimination for social
policy or public health. The expectation of government and insurers appears to
have been that with these terms of reference, several tests would quickly be
approved, and genetic discrimination normalized.
In practice the GAIC project soon faltered, largely because evidence for actuarial
relevance could not be produced to a standard which would withstand any critical
scrutiny. GAIC gave one approval in November 2000, for the use of a test for
Huntington’s disease in relation to life insurance, but this approval attracted
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much critical commentary about the standard of evidence. Minutes of a subsequent
meeting of GAIC itself acknowledged the strength of this criticism:
The quality of actuarial evidence produced for the first application [the test for
Huntington’s disease, approved by GAIC] continued to cause concern . . . It was
recognised that there is a lack of good quality, peer-reviewed actuarial evidence
relevant to genetic disorders and to GAIC.1
Meanwhile, representatives of insurers, giving evidence in early 2001 at another
parliamentary enquiry by the Science and Technology Select Committee, stated
that they were already using genetic tests without approval from GAIC, in defiance
of what the government understood had been agreed when the GAIC was estab-
lished. This defiance was strongly criticized in the Select Committee’s report
(Select Committee 2001). Separately on 1 May 2001 the Human Genetics
Commission, which had been established by the government to consider wider
(non-insurance) implications of advances in genetic knowledge, issued a statement
calling for legislation to restrict the use of genetic tests by insurers, and claiming
that: “The existing system of self-regulation has failed.”2
The government rejected this call for legislation. However faced with an
increasing likelihood of eventual legislation, in October 2001 insurers agreed
with the government a voluntary ban on the use of genetic test results in
setting insurance premiums, unless the tests had been approved by the GAIC.
For tests approved by GAIC, an insurer could use test results only for large pol-
icies providing cover above a threshold (a capital sum of £500,000 for one
person, in the case of life insurance, or £30,000 per annum for insurance which
paid out as an income). The Association of British Insurers stated that around
97% of new policies fell below these limits. This ban was initially to last until
2006, but it was repeatedly extended, most recently (in April 2011) for six
years until 2017.
New criteria for approval of tests were promulgated by GAIC in 2002, in more
detail than before, but still within the same broad paradigm: GAIC would approve
any tests which were commercially useful to insurers and for which clinical and
actuarial relevance could be demonstrated, with no consideration of any wider
social or public health implications. Applications for approval of three further
tests – for Alzheimer’s disease, breast cancer, and ovarian cancer – had been sub-
mitted by insurers as early as December 2000. But GAIC never gave a decision on
these applications, and the Association of British Insurers eventually withdrew
them. Over the next few years, minutes of meetings of GAIC repeatedly noted
the stated intentions of the insurers to re-submit the applications. However, no
applications were in fact re-submitted by insurers. GAIC therefore had little
work to do, and was eventually disbanded in 2009. The policy outcome by 2011
– a voluntary ban on the use of genetic tests until at least 2017 – was quite incon-
gruent with the strong enthusiasm of insurers and the UK government in the late
1990s to promote the use of genetic tests.
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In my view it was already obvious in the late 1990s that for the foreseeable
future, access to genetic test results would not be essential to insurers. There
were two ways of appreciating this. First, mathematical investigations of the
effect on insurance prices of ignoring genetic tests, even with the most pessimistic
assumptions, suggested that costs would be very small relative to the variations
which occur in insurance prices for many other reasons (e.g. Macdonald 1997,
2000). Second, by simple observation of the practice of insurance in different
countries, one could see that successful insurance markets operated under a
variety of conventions for risk classification. Some markets (such as life insurance
in the UK) operate with very fine classification of risk; others (such as health insur-
ance in Ireland) operate with almost no risk classification. Generally, the varying
degrees of risk classification in different markets were not well explained by tech-
nical rationales; instead the differences appeared to be largely attributable to market
culture and accidents of history.
To an informed observer who appreciated how financially insignificant genetics
was likely to be to insurance companies, the rhetoric widely used around the mil-
lennium to advance genetic discrimination could seem disturbing. Claims that
genetic test results would have a devastating effect on insurance were routinely
made, and widely accepted by insurers, scientists, and policymakers as a justifica-
tion for imposing new forms of discrimination against the unfortunate. These
claims were closely analogous to the enthusiasm of many eminent scientists for
eugenic discrimination in the first half of the twentieth century (Kevles 1985,
Thomson 1998). The banal truth was that genetic test results were not likely to
be of any great consequence in insurance for many years, and perhaps forever;
but actuarial ideology obfuscated this reality for many years.
A critique of actuarial ideology
What is meant by “actuarial ideology” here? In relation to genetics and insurance,
actuarial ideology around the millennium encompassed the following beliefs:
(1) People with knowledge of their genetic predisposition to illness will seek to
buy much larger amounts of life insurance than people without such predis-
positions (“adverse selection”).
(2) This adverse selection will have a large effect on insurance prices.
(3) Adverse selection is always a negative effect, which should be deprecated,
minimized or avoided as a matter of public policy.
This ideology is characterized as “actuarial” because in the author’s judgment it
summarizes the views of the overwhelming majority of actuaries around the time
of the millennium. But the ideology was not unique to actuaries: it was also
embraced by many geneticists, government ministers, and other opinion-formers
and policymakers. Official public statements by representatives of the Actuarial
Profession (e.g. Actuarial Profession 1999a, 2001) tended to qualify the
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uncompromising formulation of the ideology stated above, “softening” it with
some references to ethical and social issues, probably because actuaries recognized
that for public relations purposes it would be diplomatic to acknowledge such con-
cerns. Avery few actuaries publicly and unequivocally disagreed (e.g. Moultrie and
Thomas 1997, Thomas 2001). But this was a minority view, and the view of most
actuaries towards it in the late 1990s was succinctly expressed by one as follows:
In my view, only a fool or a rogue would disagreewith this principle . . . I believe that,
from a theoretical viewpoint and assuming that [life insurance] offices act responsi-
bly, we are invariably right. This is not arrogance because, looked at objectively,
anyone would have to concede the arguments. (Leigh 1996, p. 2; emphasis added)
In my view each of the elements (1) to (3) in the ideology above was misconceived
or exaggerated. The following sections elaborate on these misconceptions.
Adverse selection: the fallacy of the one-shot gambler
Around the millennium it was often suggested that people with knowledge of
genetic predisposition to illness would wish to buy large amounts of insurance.
For example, a press release from the UK Actuarial Profession in July 1999
stated as follows:
Bans [on insurers using genetic test results] have already been imposed in some
countries, such as Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and a number of states of the
USA (eg California), leaving the way open for people with knowledge of their
genetic condition to take advantage of insurance companies, thus pushing up the
cost for everyone.3
The press release did not elaborate on what was meant by people “[taking] advan-
tage of” insurance companies. However, the natural interpretation is that a person
with private knowledge of their genetic status could benefit by buying large
amounts of life insurance. This is the concept of over-insurance as an attractive
investment. For many people, it has some intuitive plausibility. But more careful
consideration, using realistic probabilities and premiums, suggests that in most rea-
listic scenarios, over-insurance is probably not an attractive investment. This is for
two reasons: (1) life insurance pays out only in the event of low-probability (in
gambling terminology, long-odds) events; and (2) the life insurance purchaser is
a “one-shot gambler” who can make their bet on these odds only once.
For example, suppose that an insurer offers me a term life insurance premium
based on an assumed risk of dying of p ¼ 2% over the term of an insurance
policy (say the next 10 years), but I have taken a genetic test which privately
tells me my real risk is three times the normal level, that is p∗ ¼ 6%. If I
“invest” in over-insurance, then my private knowledge means I pay a “favorable”
price (2% rather than 6%). But despite the “favorable” price, on a one-shot gamble
it is still overwhelmingly likely (94% likely, on the true probabilities) that I shall
just forfeit the premium.
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This one-shot gamble against long odds seems to me a relatively unattractive
proposition. It would remain unattractive for a wide range of plausible probabilities
and premiums. It may be worth buying a “normal” level of insurance for the usual
reasons, such as paying off a mortgage, or provision of adequate security for one’s
family in the unlikely and adverse scenario of early death. But the notion of over-
insurance based on a private genetic test as an attractive investment generally does
not make sense for realistic probabilities and premiums.
For over-insurance to be attractive as an investment, either (a) the gamble needs
to be repeated across many independent trials, or (b) odds of a payout need to be
relatively short. As an example of (a), if I could buy life insurance on 1000 inde-
pendent lives on the terms above, then that portfolio of bets would be an attractive
investment.4 As an example of (b), if I privately know I already have a terminal
illness from which I am 70% likely to die during the period of the insurance,
then over-insurance on the terms above is probably attractive.5 But neither of
these scenarios corresponds well to a purchaser of life insurance with some
private genetic knowledge, for whom the bet against the insurer is on long odds
and can be made only once.
Adverse selection: a relatively small effect on insurance prices
Around the millennium the claim was frequently made that if insurers were not per-
mitted to use genetic tests, this would lead to a very large rise in average insurance
prices, or even the collapse of some insurance markets. For example in response to
a consultation by the Human Genetics Commission, the Actuarial Profession com-
mented as follows (emphasis added)6:
The insurability of long term care costs by insurers may not be sustainable unless
either insurers are permitted to make use of some pre-existing genetic test results,
or some much more extensive rating framework is adopted.
Contracts which offer benefits when the insured becomes ill (eg critical illness pol-
icies, income protection and long term care) are likely to be more specific to the
issue of specific risk propensities and restriction on underwriting could prove very
damaging to the public. There could be a substantial reduction in consumer choice
through products becoming dearer or even the withdrawal of some types of product.
However these comments were generally not supported by the emerging results of
actuarial simulations of insurance markets where genetic test results are known to
customers, but unknown to insurers (e.g. Macdonald 1997, 2000, Viswanathan
et al. 2007, Macdonald and Tapadar 2010, Macdonald and Yu 2011). The results
of these simulations can be succinctly stated: to a first approximation, preventing
insurers’ access to genetic test results will probably lead to only a tiny increase
in average insurance prices, seldom rising above 1%.
The increases of less than 1% just quoted are negligible compared to other vari-
ations in insurance prices between insurance companies in the prices which are
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quoted for any particular risk. For example, if a person obtains quotes from several
UK life insurance companies, the best six quotes will typically differ by 20% or
more.7 Prices also tend to vary cyclically over time, not because of changes in
risk assessment but because of changes in the level of competition in the market,
for example when major reinsurers decide to enter or leave the market for a particu-
lar product. An index of prices for critical illness insurance in the UK fell around
25% between 1999 and 2002; then rose more than 50% in 2003 after two of the
largest reinsurers withdrew from this market; and then gradually declined again
from 2005 onwards.8 In the context of these large cross-sectional and inter-tem-
poral variations, insurers’ access to genetic test results is unlikely to have the sig-
nificance which has often been claimed.
Adverse selection: not necessarily adverse
The previous section highlighted that adverse selection attributable to genetic tests
is likely to have only a small effect on average insurance prices. It is conceivable
that this may one day change: genetics may eventually become more predictive,
and adverse selection may start to have a larger effect. But even if this scenario
materializes, it does not follow that the use of genetic tests by insurers would be
necessary or even helpful from a public policy viewpoint. Insurers always frame
adverse selection as a problem to be deprecated, avoided or minimized, and
most policymakers seem to accept this without question. But a little thought
shows that adverse selection may not be adverse from the viewpoint of society
as a whole.
The usual argument made by insurers regarding adverse selection is as follows.
Any restrictions on risk classification will tend to lead to more insurance bought
by higher risks, and less insurance bought by lower risks, so that the price of
insurance will rise; and as the number of higher risks is usually small relative
to the number of lower risks, the overall numbers insured will fall. Insurers
suggest, either explicitly or implicitly, that any adverse selection and any fall
in numbers insured must be regarded as a bad outcome from a public policy view-
point. But this argument rests on a mis-measure of the benefit of insurance to the
population as a whole. A fall in the number of people insured can be consistent
with a higher number of losses compensated by insurance, if more of the
“right” people (those likely to suffer loss) buy insurance. From a public policy
perspective, a degree of so-called “adverse” selection in insurance can often be
beneficial.
This insight can be illustrated by a simple numerical example. Suppose that in a
population of 1000, 16 people die every year. Suppose everyone takes a genetic
test, with the result that 200 people know they have a risk of dying four times
higher than the other 800 people. Assume that everyone can buy either one unit
of life insurance or none (this simplifies the presentation, but it is not necessary).
If test results are disclosed, insurers will charge different prices to standard and
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high risks. Suppose that under these conditions, exactly half of each group buys
insurance. Table 2 shows the outcome: 8 of the 16 deaths in the whole population
are compensated by insurance. This 50% “loss coverage” is an index of the social
benefit of insurance to the population as a whole.
Now suppose instead that insurers are banned from asking about genetic test
results, and so they have to charge a single “pooled” price to both the standard
and high risks. One possible outcome is shown in Table 3. The “pooled” price is
expensive for standard risks, so fewer of them buy insurance (300, compared
with 400 before). The “pooled” price is also cheaper for high risks, so more of
them buy insurance (150, compared with 100 before). Because there are four
times as many standard risks as high risks in the population, the total number of
policies sold falls (450, compared with 500 before). This is adverse selection,
and it is often asserted that it must always be bad. But in this case, the shift in cover-
age towards high risks more than outweighs the fall in number of policies sold: 9 of
the 16 deaths in the population as a whole are now compensated by insurance (com-
pared with 8 of 16 before). A moderate degree of adverse selection has led to higher
loss coverage – a good outcome.
Table 2. Insurers use genetic test results: no adverse selection.
Standard risk High risk
Population: 800 200
Risk: 1/100 4/100
Break-even premiums (differentiated): 1/100 4/100
Insurance purchases: 400 100






Table 3. Insurers banned from using genetic test results: moderate adverse selection leading to
increased loss coverage (good outcome).
Standard risk High risk
Population: 800 200
Risk: 1/100 4/100
Break-even premium (pooled):  2/100 
Insurance purchases: 300 150
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However, if the adverse selection becomes too severe, this can lead to a bad
outcome. This possibility is shown in Table 4. Only 200 of the standard risks and
125 of the high risks buy insurance, giving a total number of policies sold of 325.
The shift in coverage towards high risks is insufficient to outweigh the fall in
number of policies sold: only 7 of the 16 deaths in the population are now compen-
sated by insurance (compared with 8 of 16 in Table 2, and 9 of 16 in Table 3). The
high degree of adverse selection has led to lower loss coverage – a bad outcome.
Which of Tables 3 or 4 represents the more likely outcome if insurers are banned
from asking about genetic test results? The answer depends on the relative numbers
in the high and low risk groups, their relative risks, and an economic quantity
known as elasticity of demand for insurance in the higher and lower risk groups
– essentially a measure of the responsiveness of each group’s insurance purchasing
behavior to changes in price. These dependencies are explored in recent papers in
the insurance and actuarial literature (Thomas 2007, 2008, 2009). These suggest
that given plausible elasticities of demand, some restrictions on risk classification
are likely to increase loss coverage. Under the loss coverage criterion, public policy
on risk classification can be seen as a question of degree: what degree of restriction
on risk classification is required to induce the optimal degree of adverse selection,
which maximizes the loss coverage? For example, restrictions on the use of genetic
test results may increase loss coverage; and perhaps further restrictions, extending
to say family history, may also increase loss coverage; but if the use of age as a risk
factor was also restricted, this might “go too far,” reducing loss coverage.
Reasons why actuarial ideology was initially embraced by policymakers
Despite adverse selection having only small (and perhaps socially beneficial)
effects as described above, the view that insurance companies should be allowed
to use genetic test results appeared to be widely accepted by UK public policy-
makers and opinion-formers for some years around the millennium. We now
suggest some reasons why this view gained wide acceptance.
Table 4. Insurers banned from using genetic test results: severe adverse selection leading to reduced
loss coverage (bad outcome).
Standard risk High risk
Population: 800 200
Risk: 1/100 4/100
Break-even premium (pooled):  2.15/100 
Insurance purchases: 200 125








At its simplest, policymakers’ endorsement of genetic tests in insurance can be seen
as reflecting an error of magnitude: the misconception that genetic test results
would imminently become highly material to insurers, when in fact they would
remain quite inconsequential. The error of magnitude can be attributed to several
factors which encouraged insurers to over-state the significance of genetic tests
to their business. First, a precautionary principle of taking any perceived threat
seriously. Second, a political calculation that claims of large effects would be
more likely to achieve insurers’ desired policy outcomes. But in my opinion, the
notion of insurers publicly exaggerating for political purposes effects which they
privately knew were very small over-states the rationality of insurers’ reactions.
A third, probably more significant, cause of the error was moral panic by many
insurance experts concerning the perceived “threat” to the insurance industry of
people with genetic predispositions (this is elaborated later in the article).
Public relations campaigns
As noted by van Hoyweghen et al. (2005), for some years the insurance industry
appeared to assume that a public relations campaign could persuade policymakers
that insurers should be allowed to use genetic test results. It was suggested that those
who argued against genetic discrimination in insurance on ethical or social grounds
were misunderstanding or disregarding the arithmetical facts of insurance. Insurers’
efforts to “educate” the public benefited from a strong hierarchy of credibility:
because insurance is a technical field in which most people feel uninformed, insurers
themselveswere generallyperceivedas themost credible sources of information. Itwas
easy for insurers to insinuate that critics lacked technical knowledge, or were discre-
dited by their own disadvantaged status as persons affected by genetic conditions.
Scientism
Van Hoyweghen et al. (2005) notes that after initially viewing genetics as a
problem of public misunderstanding which could be solved by “education,”
insurers’ second approach was to claim that science could justify genetic discrimi-
nation. These claims were very prevalent around the millennium, and for some
years they appear to have been accepted by the UK government and others; the
establishment of GAIC was predicated on this model of “scientific” discrimination.
The hope that actuarial research would provide robust justifications for discrimi-
nation led insurers to take an increased interest in (and provide more funding
for) such research. As it became clear that actuarial research would not in fact
give robust justifications for genetic discrimination, insurers’ interest in such
research appears to have declined. Rather than justifying genetic discrimination,
research has tended to cast fresh doubt on long-established practices, not just in
relation to genetics but also in other areas of underwriting (van Hoyweghen 2010).
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Cognitive regulatory capture
The apparent concern of UK policymakers to legitimize the use of genetic tests by
insurers reflected the fact that policy was substantially shaped by the insurers them-
selves. There were many manifestations of this. In the initial GAIC, all members
with insurance expertise were employees of insurance companies, rather than aca-
demics or independent consultants. Two of the initial members of GAIC were also
working with the Association of British Insurers on preparing the applications
which GAIC was supposed to assess.9 Parts of GAIC’s annual reports were some-
times drafted and supplied to GAIC by insurance companies.10
The perception of cognitive regulatory capture is also supported by government
papers from the period 1999–2001, which I obtained in 2009 and 2010 from the
Department of Health by means of requests pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act. Communications from the Association of British Insurers (ABI) in these
papers indicate that the concept of tests being validated by a body such as GAIC
was originally suggested to the government by the ABI itself, and in establishing
the committee the government largely followed the ABI’s proposals.11 On 22
July 1999, the chairman of GAIC wrote to the responsible minister noting that
“You will understand that there is strong pressure from the industry members of
the committee to validate these and indeed other tests that are currently in use by
some insurance companies.”12 On 12 August 1999, an official at the Department
of Trade and Industry wrote to a colleague that “There must be a real risk to the
credibility of GAIC if the test for Huntingdon’s does not pass.”13 The “credibility”
of GAIC to policymakers apparently depended on its supporting the insurance
industry.
When it became apparent that GAIC was nevertheless struggling to approve
tests, ways were suggested to relax the criteria it had set to a level which insurers
might be able to meet. On 25 October 2000, the Government Actuary, writing on
behalf of the Actuarial Profession, urged that a lower standard of actuarial evidence
should be accepted by GAIC: “It seems, therefore, that the remit of GAIC may be to
accept a somewhat lower burden of proof than fully developed academic research
results to back each submission.”14 This search for a way to lower standards of evi-
dence required from insurers in some publicly acceptable way persisted until the
end of GAIC’s life: as late as 2008, GAIC minutes noted a planned meeting
with the Association of British Insurers to discuss ways of relaxing the GAIC
requirements in order to “to speed up tests being brought to the Committee.”15
Moral panic
The concept of moral panic (Cohen 1973) is normally understood as a phenomenon
affecting a broad public. The term refers to hostility expressed by a large number of
people towards a stigmatized minority group which is believed to threaten the
social order. The concern expressed in a moral panic is disproportionate to any
actual threat represented by the minority. Social issues which have been suggested
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as attracting moral panics include Satanic ritual abuse (Victor 1993), pedophilia
(Jewkes 2004) and human trafficking for prostitution (Davies 2009). In the case
of genetics and insurance, a similar phenomenon could be said to have afflicted
the community of insurance experts, which we might characterize as expert
panic: a strong (but factually disproportionate) belief among many experts that a
minority group with genetic predispositions represented an existential threat to
the insurance industry.
Responses to public consultations and similar documents produced for public
consumption tend to be anodyne, with the actual views of the respondent obscured
by a veneer of platitudes. Expert panic is clearer in contemporary articles written
for actuaries and other insider groups of experts, rather than platitudes developed
for wide public dissemination. One example is an article “The freedom to under-
write” (Leigh 1996) presented to a large audience of actuaries at the Actuarial Pro-
fession’s headquarters in London in 1996. The article included the following
remarks on genetics and insurance (all emphasis has been added):
Myownfeeling is that the government shouldoutlawall formsof homeandpostal testing
. . . The industry will have terrible problems if legislation does not take place. (p. 15)
Recently, somepreserved samples from the bodyof theUSpolitician,HubertHumphrey,
have been tested. It has been discovered that his bladder cancer could have been diag-
nosed with genetic testing over ten years before he had any symptoms. Think of the
damage individuals could inflict on the industry with such knowledge. (p. 16)
We have to protect ourselves and our existing policyholders from proposers who
know the results of genetic or other tests which reveal a poor outlook. (p. 18)
Taking this a stage further, a salesman could legitimately visit hospices signing up
many of the occupants. Notices might even be placed in doctors’ waiting rooms.
Even our most vicious critics should realise that this is untenable. (p. 23)
If genetic history is bannedonproposals,adverse selectionbecomesamajor issue. (p. 23)
I would agree but it could herald the end of life assurance as we know it. (p. 44)
Another example was an article by an insurance company medical consultant “Gen-
etics – the poisoned chalice” (Walker 1996) published in the Transactions of the
Assurance Medical Society, which included the following remarks (all emphasis
has been added):
If the genetics lobby wins this battle then the amount of adverse selection will be such
that the industry as we know it can no longer survive. (p. 48)
If the situation arises where the proposer knows the results of his genetic tests but the
insurance company has to remain in ignorance of these tests, then insurance companies
and their funds will be unprotected and adverse selection will be rife. Premiums would
New Genetics and Society 13
undoubtedly rise to such an extent as to make the cost of insurance prohibitive for the
average individual. If this happens insurance companies would cease to exist. (p. 50)
If we are denied access to genetic informationwe are being denied access to all medical
information and the life insurance industry would no longer exist. (p. 51)
Articles such as these suggest a disproportionate perception of a threat posed by people
affected by genetic conditions. Interestingly, this was not the first occasion where
insurers had panicked about a supposed existential threat from a stigmatized minority.
In the late 1980s a similar panic arose in relation to HIVand AIDS. For several years,
many insurers refused to provide any life insurance to gay men, and those that did
charged greatly increased premiums. But in October 2004, the Association of
British Insurers issued guidance that insurers should no longer ask any questions
about sexuality on application forms. They also noted that “In the past, life insurance
underwriters may have used certain information contained on an application form to
make speculative underwriting decisions. Answers to questions about occupation
and house co-purchase were occasionally used in assessing HIV risk.”16
The affectation of tough-minded virtue
Another reason why genetic discrimination was often supported may have been
that the support was associated with connotations of tough-minded virtue by the
commentator. Faced with the personally tragic problem of genetic predisposition
to illness, a natural empathetic response is a desire to help those affected, for
example by preventing insurers from using genetic tests. However the essence
of actuarial orthodoxy is that this response is short-sighted: the attempt to
help will lead to a decline in insurance coverage and eventually the collapse of
insurance markets. Essentially actuarial orthodoxy demands immediate pain
(genetic discrimination) for supposed long-term gain (the survival of the insurance
system).
Although the implied necessity for genetic discrimination was almost always over-
stated, the moral narrative of immediate pain for long-term gain was appealing to
many commentators. Advocacy of immediate pain to secure long-term gain seems
to carry a connotation of virtue. But for genetics and insurance, the commentators
are almost invariably privileged persons who do not bear the pain themselves: the
pain they advocate is to be imposed on disadvantaged others. This makes the conno-
tation of virtue illusory: there is no virtue in advocating that pain be imposed on dis-
advantaged others for the benefit of one’s own privileged class.
Reasons why actuarial ideology has fallen from favor
By the middle of the 2000s, the panic concerning genetic tests and insurance
around the turn of the decade had largely subsided. The moratorium on genetics
and insurance initiated in 2001 was repeatedly extended; as of 2011 it has been
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extended at least until 2017. GAIC was disbanded in 2009. Also in 2009, the
medical director of one health insurance company wrote that “The most important
aspect of the issue is the ethical one . . . by looking at genetic profiles, the insurer is
going against the very ethic of the community . . .” (Khemka 2009); the managing
director of another health insurance company was reported as stating that the fact
that a person had taken a genetic test could be regarded by insurers as a positive
indication of health-conscious behavior (Henderson 2009). These views – radi-
cally different from those expressed by insurers a few years earlier – suggest a
decline in salience of the actuarial ideology discussed above.
What were the reasons for this decline in salience? We suggest the following
reasons.
Lack of progress in genetic prediction
When GAIC was established, insurers and policymakers wrongly assumed that
very rapid progress would be made in accurate testing for genetic predisposition.
The expectation of the early arrival of a world where widely available genetic
tests are extremely predictive can be seen as part of the expert panic referred to
earlier. This world has not materialized.
Lack of support from ongoing actuarial research
Insurers would undoubtedly have liked to use genetic tests with the same freedom
from regulation as for other types of information. Evidence for their relevance and
reliability may be weak, but insurers have traditionally based many of their classi-
fications on weak evidence, prejudice or hunches; for example the speculative
stereotypes of occupation and HIV that were mentioned above. However,
ongoing actuarial research over the decade from 2010 provided little support for
the insurers’ claims that access to tests was essential. Macdonald and Yu (2011)
synthesized several studies to estimate the overall cost of restrictions on insurers’
use of genetic information under various assumptions about market size and custo-
mer behavior. They found that these estimates were “all very small, only in the most
extreme cases rising above 1% of premiums.” (p. 343)
Some commentators suggested that the evidence required by GAIC to approve
genetic tests raised questions about the lack of equivalent evidence to support
other common practices of insurers (e.g. Macdonald 2000, Daykin et al. 2003).
This accords with the findings of interviews with executives at two European rein-
surance companies (van Hoyweghen and Horstman 2009), which noted that efforts
to document a stronger evidence base for ratings, initiated with the hope of de-poli-
ticizing the issues of genetics and risk classification, have instead tended to high-
light the lack of evidence for many established practices, and so opened new
questions about fairness. Faced with demands for a higher standard of evidence,
and fearing that the same higher standards might be demanded for other poorly evi-
denced practices, UK insurers may have decided that the intense scrutiny which
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would accompany any further attempt to gain approval for the use of specific
genetic tests would not advance their interests.
Lack of public acceptance of GAIC’s rationale
The most immediate and obvious sense in which GAIC did not fulfill insurers’ and
governmentministers’ expectationswas that after the first approval of the test forHun-
tington’s disease in December 2000, no further tests were ever approved. But even if
GAIC had approvedmore tests, it might not have succeeded in its underlying purpose
of achieving public acceptance for genetic discrimination. GAIC’s (hypothetical)
approval of tests appeared to be intended to lend an official imprimatur to genetic dis-
crimination, signaling that the inferior treatment of those affected by genetic predis-
positions was sanctioned by the State. It was never explained why the State’s
endorsement of discrimination should be reassuring to people affected by genetic
predispositions. For many people, this concept was uncomfortably reminiscent of
discredited State-sponsored eugenic projects in the first half of the twentieth century,
in the United States, Nordic countries, and Germany. In this sense the concept of
State approval might increase rather than reduce alarm about discrimination.
Background changes in permitted risk classifications
InMarch 2011, the Test-Achats judgment (Case C-236/09) of the European Court of
Justice ruled that insurers in the European Union would not be permitted to charge
different premiums to men and women after 31 December 2012. This was a signifi-
cant change for the UK (and for many European states), because different prices for
men and women are almost universal in almost all types of insurance, and there are
statistically well-evidenced differences between genders for most types of insurance
risk. The Court appeared to accept these statistics, but nevertheless reached its
judgment on an overriding fundamental right to equal treatment (Mabbett 2011).
This development may normalize to some degree the principle of public policy
restrictions on risk classification. From the insurers’ perspective, the fundamental
restriction on the use of gender, one of the most widely used rating factors, may
put restrictions on the use of genetic test results into their proper perspective.
How will genetic tests affect insurance in future?
As recounted above, many predictions of the impact of genetic tests on insurance
made in the early 2000s have turned out to be greatly exaggerated. Progress to date
in predictive genetic testing has been slower than was widely expected a decade
ago. However, given the strong ideological commitment to genetic discrimination
within the insurance industry, it is possible that insurers may seek to use test results
in future. Although GAIC was disbanded in 2009, the Department of Health still
intended that a “panel of expert and lay individuals” could be convened to hear
any application from insurers to use particular genetic tests. It is possible that
insurers will seek to use this mechanism.
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Another possibility is that insurers may seek to justify discrimination by
rationales different from the evidence-based approach embodied in GAIC. As an
example of this, the actuaries Daykin et al. (2003) expressed dissatisfaction with
the inability of GAIC to progress the insurers’ agenda, and referred to hypothetical
future applications to GAIC as “specious statistical exercises for which data may
not be available for another ten or more years.” (p. 817) They suggested that a dem-
onstration of statistical significance should not be required, and that insurers should
be allowed to use genetic test results if they could demonstrate “financial vulner-
ability” to applicants with private knowledge of genetic test results. No definition
of “financial vulnerability” was given, but it was suggested that the test should be
easier for insurers to satisfy than the GAIC requirements.
Another possibility is that insurers could introduce discrimination gradually and
covertly, hoping to avoid regulatory or public attention. There are no legal obstacles
to this: the current voluntary ban on use of genetic tests is specifically stated to have
no legal force.17 Covert discrimination may be an attractive option to insurers,
given the apparent difficulty of justifying discrimination in ways which meet
public scrutiny (e.g. the GAIC process), combined with the strong ideological
commitment of insurers to discrimination. The opacity of insurance pricing – in
particular the absence of any obligation for insurers to explain that a customer’s
premium has been loaded for a health or genetic reason – may make covert dis-
crimination difficult to detect.
A more optimistic possibility is that the insurance industry’s ideological commit-
ment to discrimination may gradually weaken over time. Moral panics are typically
transient. Matters which seem important to one generation are sometimes matters of
indifference to the next. The recent imposition of unisex pricing in Europe will
force insurers to find ways of operating without one of their traditional risk classi-
fications, and may also normalize the principle of public policy restrictions on risk
classification. As noted earlier in this paper, the UK insurance industry of the 1980s
was openly and unapologetically homophobic, with questions about occupation,
joint house purchase and taking a HIV test (with a negative result) being used
by many insurers to reject applicants who were suspected of being gay; but by
2005 the ABI deprecated these practices as “speculative,” and recommended that
only positive HIV test results should affect underwriting decisions. Further back
in the 1960s, UK insurers openly practiced racial discrimination, charging so-
called “racial extras” to some ethnic groups (Leigh 1996); but following the
implementation of the Race Relations Act 1968 which effectively banned this
practice, insurers have never argued for the Act’s repeal.
The analogy of genetic discrimination with racial discrimination is instructive.
There are some well-evidenced differences between races in mortality and morbid-
ity.18 At various historical times and places these differences have been a focus of
intense attention, sometimes leading to some State interventions which have come
to be widely seen as mistakes (e.g. Nazi racial science; compulsory sickle cell trait
screening for African Americans in many US states). More recently it has been
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recognized that obsessive attention to racial differences generally does not provide
a helpful basis for social policy. In the UK and in many other countries, public
opinion is now strongly opposed to focusing on such differences. It is possible
that focus on genetic differences will follow a similar historical arc of initial enthu-
siasm followed by mature restraint.
A GAIC-type process may be able to demonstrate some differences in mortality
or morbidity between people with different genetic characteristics, just as some
differences could be demonstrated by race; but the fact that it is possible to demon-
strate such differences does not make it necessary or helpful to do so. The difficulty
in distinguishing genetic from non-genetic information may lead over time to
demands for the principle of non-discrimination to be extended to more types of
predictive tests (van Hoyweghen 2010). The calculative core of actuarial work –
estimating mortality and other risks from past data, and forecasting their evolution
in future – can be applied with any scheme of risk classification, including no
classification at all (as for example in universal social security schemes). It is
possible that the insurance experts of the future may have a weaker ideological
commitment to genetic discrimination than those of the past.
Notes
1. Minutes of 9th meeting of GAIC, 19 March 2001. Provided in response to author’s Freedom of
Information Act request.
2. Human Genetics Commission (2001).
3. Actuarial Profession (1999b).
4. For example: if I “invest” a premium of say £10 on each life (total outlay £10,000), I can expect
to win approximately 60 times, collecting 60 × £10 × 50 ¼ £30,000, giving an expected profit
of £20,000. This result is subject to random variation. But by spreading my bets across 1000
independent lives I can be 99% sure that I will win between 41 and 79 times, giving a profit
between £10,500 and £29,500. This contrasts with the one-shot gamble, where it is
overwhelmingly likely that I just lose my £10,000.
5. For example: if I “invest” a premium of say £10,000, this gives a 70% chance of creating an
estate of £500,000 for my heirs. This makes it probably worth accepting the 30% chance of
losing my £10,000.
6. Actuarial Profession (2001).
7. Some data on the variation of actual life insurance prices in the UK are given in Langkjær-
Øhlenschlæger and McGaughey (2001) and Thomas (2005).
8. This is based on an index of guaranteed critical illness insurance premiums compiled by
insurance brokers Lifesearch Limited.
9. This is documented in the First report of the Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC 2001),
and the Minutes of the 4th Meeting of GAIC (provided to author pursuant to Freedom of
Information Act).
10. See for example Appendices E and F to the Second report of the Genetics and Insurance
Committee (GAIC 2004), which were drafted by Swiss Re.
11. As stated in a letter dated 3 August 1999 from the Association of British Insurers to the
Department of Health. Copy provided to author pursuant to Freedom of Information Act.
12. Letter dated 22 July 1999 from chairman of GAIC to Minister of State for Public Health. Copy
provided to author pursuant to Freedom of Information Act.
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13. Letter dated 12 August 1999 from an official at the Department of Trade and Industry, provided
to author pursuant to Freedom of Information Act.
14. Letter to GAIC from the Actuarial Profession dated 25 October 2000, provided to author
pursuant to Freedom of Information Act.
15. As stated in the Minutes of the 28th Meeting of GAIC held on 29 July 2008 (www.hgc.gov.uk
[Accessed 10 January 2010]).
16. ABI consumer guide for gay men on HIVand life insurance (www.abi.org.uk [Accessed 26 June
2011]).
17. Paragraph 9 of the Concordat and moratorium on genetics and insurance (Association of
British Insurers 2005).
18. Crimmins and Saito (2001) examine racial differences in mortality for United States data.
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